Amendment. 31 However, some commentators note that Americans believed they retained the same rights as English citizens, including the English common law prohibition against excessive prison sentences. 32 They argue that these debates merely indicate that Americans wanted to extend the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause to include the harsh punishments they experienced under English rule. 33 B. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON PROPORTIONALITY REQUdREMENTS TO SENTENCING
The Supreme Court first discussed a proportionality requirement in sentencing under the Eighth Amendment in 1892 in O 'Neil v. Vermont. 34 In O'Neil, a county court sentenced the defendant to over fifty-four years of hard labor in the house of corrections for 307 offenses of selling liquor without authority. 35 The majority's opinion declined to consider the question of whether the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the defendant had not raised the issue in his appeal, and because the Eighth Amendment did not apply to states at the time. 36 Justice Field dissented, arguing that the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause protects "against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. 3 7 Justices Harlan and Brewer also contended that the sentence must be found cruel and unusual in view of the offense committed. 3 8 Eighteen years later in Weems v. United States, 39 the Supreme Court indicated that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality in sentencing. 40 A trial court sentenced Weems to the statutorily required fifteen years labor in prison with a chain attached to his ankle for falsifying a government document. 4 31 Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting) (asserting that the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause is not only directed "to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs, and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffering"). 38 Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 39 217 U.S. 349, 359-66 (1910) . 40 Id. 41 Id. at 362-66.
(Vol. 94 civil rights and surveillance after his release. 42 The Supreme Court found both the method of punishment and the relationship between the crime committed and the punishment imposed to offend the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause. 43 On proportionality, the Court stated, "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should begraduated and proportioned to offense. 44 Justice McKenna refused to interpret the Eighth Amendment narrowly by only prohibiting certain modes of punishment used before the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 45 He argued that the Eighth Amendment should not "be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. 4 6 In 1962, the Supreme Court held in Robinson v. California 47 that the Eighth Amendment applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that imprisoning a defendant because he was addicted to drugs violated the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause. 8 The Court agreed that the state had a legitimate interest in combating narcotic traffic, but held that this was not a legitimate means for combating the problem. 4 9 Courts should determine whether a punishment violates the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause by a proportional comparison between the offense and sentence, and not on an abstract assessment of the punishment: "To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold.", 50 In 1980, the Court in Rummel v. Estelle 5 1 held that the federal courts are not to apply proportionality review of prison sentences for felony crimes except in the most extreme situations imaginable.
The trial court sentenced Rummel to a mandated life sentence under a Texas recidivist statute for his third felony conviction with eligibility for parole in twelve 42 Id. 41 Id. at 366-67. 44 Id. at 367. 41 Id. at 373. 46 id. 47 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) . 48 Id. 49 Id. at 667-68. so Id. at 667. s 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980) . 52 See id. at 274 n. 11 (conceding the proportionality principle would come into play if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment).
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW years. 53 Rummel's case was notable because his convictions were all property-related and involved modest sums: fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services, passing a forged check for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. 54 In a five to four decision, Justice Rehnquist stressed that determining proportional prison sentences is a subjective determination best decided by legislative bodies. 55 The Court rejected Rummel's argument that his sentence was disproportionate because no other jurisdiction punished habitual offenders as harshly as Texas. 56 First, the Court was unconvinced that Texas's recidivist statute was clearly harsher than other jurisdictions. 57 Second, the Court noted that parole and prosecutorial discretion made comparative analysis of recidivist statutes across states too complex. 8 Finally, the Court noted that federalism naturally leads some states to have harsher penalties than other states due to differences in local interests, and courts should not forbid such states from protecting unique interests. 59 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Rummel two years later in a six Justice per curiam opinion in Hutto v. Davis. 6° In Hutto, a Virginia state court sentenced the defendant to forty years imprisonment for both possession with intent to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana. 61 The majority opinion repeated "that federal courts should be 'reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,' and that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare."' 6 2 The opinion also rejected the four-factor test used by the lower court to gauge proportionality: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) the legislative purpose behind the choice of punishment for the crime; (3) a comparison of sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions; and (4) a comparison of the seriousness of crimes punished by the same sentence in the same jurisdiction. [Vol. 94
In 1983, the Supreme Court reversed its position on testing the proportionality of sentences. In Solem v. Helm, 64 a five Justice majority held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony. 65 The majority distinguished Rummel because the defendant in Rummel had a possibility of parole. 66 The majority based its holding on the standards implicitly developed by the Court's opinions from Weems to Rummel. 67 The Solem Court advanced a three-part test: (1) whether the severity of the punishment was proportional to the offense; (2) a comparison of the punishment to other punishments in the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses; and (3) a comparison of the punishments for the same offense in other jurisdictions. 68 Applying these factors to the defendant's case, the Court held that the punishment violated the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause. In particular, the Court emphasized that Solem had no possibility of parole, while the defendant in Rummel was eligible for parole in twelve years. 69 Thus, the Court did not overrule Rummel.
70
The Supreme Court did not address proportionality in sentencing again until 1991 in Harmelin v. Michigan. 7 1 A Michigan court sentenced Harmelin under a mandatory sentencing statute to life imprisonment without the possibility for parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. 72 Five Justices held that Harmelin's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 7 3 In a concurring opinion joined by two other Justices, Justice Kennedy recognized four proportionality principles in the Court's previous decisions: (1) the setting of the lengths of prison terms had its primacy in the legislative branch; (2) the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one penological system; (3) the recognition of the benefits of a federal system of government; and (4) the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors. 7 4 Considering these principles, Justice Kennedy concluded, "The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids ' 463 U.S. 277 (1983 C. CALIFORNIA'S "THREE STRIKES" LEGISLATION California's current three strikes law was designed to increase the prison terms of repeat felons. 7 8 The statute applies to a defendant convicted of a felony, who has previously been convicted of one or more prior felonies defined as "serious" or "violent" by the statute. 9 Prosecutors must allege prior convictions in the charging document. 80 The jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, must decide if the alleged prior convictions are true.
81
If the prosecution proves a defendant has one prior "serious" or "violent" felony conviction, then the court must sentence him to "twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction."
82
If the prosecution proves a defendant has two or more prior "serious" or "violent" felony convictions, then the court must sentence him to "an indeterminate term of life imprisonment." 83 Defendants sentenced to life under the three strikes law become eligible for parole on a date calculated by reference to a "minimum term," which is the greater of: (a) three times the term otherwise required for the current conviction; (b) twenty-five years; or (c) the term determined by the court pursuant to § 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancements. 84 Under California law, courts can classify certain offenses as either felonies or misdemeanors. 8 5 These offenses are termed "wobblers. 86 A "wobbler" can act as a triggering offense under California's three strikes law if courts treat it as a felony. 87 A "wobbler" is "presumptively a felony and 'remains a felony except when the discretion is actually exercised' to make the crime a misdemeanor." 88 Prosecutors may exercise their discretion to charge a "wobbler" as either a felony or a misdemeanor. 89 Similarly, California trial courts can reduce a "wobbler" charged as a felony to a misdemeanor, thus avoiding imposition of a three strikes sentence.
90
When exercising this discretion, a court should consider "those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions," such as "the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense .... [and] the general objectives of sentencing."
California trial courts may also vacate allegations of prior "serious" or "violent" felony convictions. 91 This may be done either sua sponte or on motion by the prosecution. 92 In deciding whether to vacate allegations of prior felony convictions, a judge should consider whether, "'in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant's] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [three strikes] scheme's spirit, in whole or in part."' 93 Thus, the three strikes statute gives trial courts discretion to avoid imposing a three strikes sentence by either reducing a "wobbler" to a misdemeanor or by vacating allegations of prior "serious" or "violent" felony convictions.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning of March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing entered the pro shop of the El Segundo Golf Course in Los Angeles County, California. 94 He looked around the shop for ten to fifteen minutes, and then approached the employee of the shop and purchased a token redeemable for golf balls on SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
EWING v. CALIFORNIA
The Court first reviewed California's purposes in enacting its three strikes statute.' 36 The California Legislature made the deliberate choice to enact the three strikes law to address the severe problem of crime by repeat felons.' 37 Accordingly, California decided incapacitation of individuals who repeatedly engaged in serious or violent criminal behavior was necessary in order to protect the public safety. 38 Indeed, many other states enacted similar three strikes laws between 1993 and 1995.139 The Eighth Amendment does not forbid California from choosing to incapacitate repeat felons.
140
Courts should defer to legislative policy choices on punishment.' 4 ' Studies indicate that past felons are a serious public safety concern in California and throughout the Nation. 142 Thus, California had a legitimate interest in incapacitating repeat criminals. 43 Though many critics have doubted the principles, effectiveness, and cost-efficiency of the three strikes laws, the Supreme Court does not sit as "superlegislature" to "second-guess" the legislature. 44 The legislature has the responsibility of making the difficult policy choices in constructing a criminal sentencing scheme.
45
The Court then assessed Ewing's specific claim that his sentence of twenty-five years to life was disproportionate to his offense. 146 The Court addressed the threshold question of whether an inference of gross disproportionality resulted from a comparison of Ewing's offense to the harshness of his punishment.
147
In assessing the severity of Ewing's offense, the Court did not just consider Ewing's offense for felony grand theft, but also his long history of felony recidivism. 148 Otherwise, the Court would not properly defer to the legislature's choice of punishments for repeat felons.
149
Ewing's severe sentence was justified by California's the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 1001-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-28 (plurality opinion). 137 Id. at 25-28 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
1'9 Id. at 24 (plurality opinion). 140 Id. at 25 (plurality opinion). 141 Id. (plurality opinion). 142 Id. at 26 (plurality opinion) (noting several studies indicating that felony offenders had high recidivism rates). 143 Id. (plurality opinion). 144 Id. at 27-28 (plurality opinion). 1s Id. at 28 (plurality opinion).
146 Id. (plurality opinion). 147 Id. (plurality opinion). 141 Id. at 29 (plurality opinion). 149 Id. (plurality opinion).
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"public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record.' 50 Therefore, the plurality rejected Ewing's Eighth Amendment claim. ' 5 1
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRING OPINION
In Justice Scalia's concurrence, he argued that the Eighth Amendment does not require proportionality review of prison sentences. 5 1 Justice Scalia first reiterated his position that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" only proscribed certain modes of punishment and was not a guarantee against disproportionate sentences.'53
Justice Scalia would accept a narrow proportionality principle out of respect for stare decisis, but does not believe courts could apply it intelligently. 54 In particular, Justice Scalia argued that proportionality review is inapplicable given the Court's acceptance of a variety of penological theories.155 The concept of proportionality between offense and punishment is "inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of retribution."' 56 However, proportionality is not related to other accepted penological theories, such as deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 57 Thus, the proportionality assessment comparing the gravity of the offense against the harshness of punishment does not help settle whether the punishment is justified by the "State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons."' ' 58 Courts could demand that punishments reasonably pursue the penological goal of a statute. 59 However, this would require courts to evaluate policy decisions, rather than apply the law. 160
C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Thomas's brief concurrence concluded that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle.' 6 ' Instead, the Eighth If a claim meets this threshold requirement, then courts should conduct a comparative analysis between the defendant's sentence and sentences imposed for other crimes in the state and sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.'
67
This analysis would confirm whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime.' 68 Justice Breyer then considered the threshold question of whether Ewing's punishment was grossly disproportionate to his offense. First, Justice Breyer compared Ewing's punishment with the punishments presented in the Supreme Court's two previous disproportionality claims concerning recidivist sentencing in Rummel and Solem. 169 Three different sentence-related characteristics define the relevant spectrum: (1) "the length of the prison term in real time, i.e., the time that the offender is likely actually to spend in prison;" (2) the sentence-triggering criminal offense; and (3) the offender's criminal history.1 7 0 Analyzing these factors among the defendants in Rummel and Solem, Justice Breyer concluded that the one critical factor that explained the difference in outcomes in the two cases was the length of the likely prison term in real time.1 7 ' Justice Breyer found that Ewing's sentence-triggering criminal offense and criminal history differed Ewing's sentence-triggering behavior ranked "well toward the bottom of the criminal conduct scale" considering the harm caused to society, the magnitude of the offense, and the offender's culpability. 76 Ewing's past criminal conduct should not be included in an assessment of the seriousness of his offense, because the proper analysis is to consider "the offense that triggers the life sentence."' 177 Finally, many judges would consider Ewing's sentence disproportionate based on The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines. 178 Factoring these three considerations together, Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's claim must pass the threshold test as appearing to be grossly disproportionate. 1 79 After Ewing's claim passed the threshold test, Justice Breyer first conducted a comparative analysis between the defendant's sentence and sentences imposed for other crimes in the state. 180 Recidivists in California rarely received sentences as long as Ewing, especially those who were also convicted of grand theft. In addition, criminals convicted of far worse crimes than Ewing receive sentences equal or less than Ewing.' 81 Justice Breyer then conducted a comparative analysis between the defendant's sentence and sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. First, the United States would impose a sentence not to exceed eighteen months under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on a recidivist like Ewing. 182 Second, courts could not sentence a Ewing-type offender to more 172 Id. at 38-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 173 Id. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 174 Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 175 Id. at 40-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 176 Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer maintained that Ewing's offense "ranks toward the bottom of the scale," when he considered three other factors suggested by the Solicitor General: the frequency of the crime's commission, the difficulty in detecting the crime, and the degree with which the crime may be deterred by differing amounts of punishment. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) . 177 Id. at 41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Courts are to consider the defendant's criminal history when considering the severity of the sentence: Id.
17' Ewing, 538 U.S. at 41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 179 Id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Breyer assessed California's penological goals that might justify Ewing's disproportionately harsh sentence.
1 86 First, ease in administering California's three strike law sentencing is not a valid justification for sentencing Ewing to such a severe sentence., 87 Second, a temporal order anomaly existed in California's three strikes statute. 188 That is, California had lower qualifications for a third strike than the other strikes. 189 Thus, a criminal who graduated from two serious crimes to a lesser crime could be subject to the three strikes statute while a criminal who graduated from a less serious crime to two crimes that are more serious would not be subject to the three strikes statute. 90 Third, California's statute classifies petty theft as a felony only when a defendant has a previous property-related felony offense, not when the defendant has been only convicted of violent felony offenses unrelated to property. 9 1 Justice Breyer concluded that these anomalies were unnecessary to promote California's criminal law objectives. [
though it was only joined by two other Justices.
After Harmelin, lower court decisions assessing sentence disproportionality claims were typically organized into two sections. First, the court would reiterate the principles of proportionality, emphasizing that criminal punishment determinations are normally the province of legislative bodies. 
B. EWING AND SUBSEQUENT LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF SENTENCE DISPROPORTIONALITY CLAIMS
The plurality opinion in Ewing implemented Justice Kennedy's analytical framework from Harmelin without any explicit changes. 22 ' Thus, facially at least, the plurality opinion does not seem to significantly alter the Court's sentence proportionality doctrine. However, the plurality opinion repeatedly stressed California's legitimate right to determine criminal policy, suggesting that courts should be even more deferential to state criminal policy decisions. 222 In particular, Justice O'Connor stated that incapacitation of repeat criminals, including property offenders, is a constitutional criminal policy decision. 223 Perhaps most significantly, though, the Court's holding gives lower courts another factual benchmark for assessing sentence disproportionality claims. A key fact in the case was that Ewing was eligible for parole in twenty-five years, thus closing the gap between the unconstitutional sentence in Solem where no parole was available and the constitutional sentence in Rummel where the offender was eligible for parole in twelve years. 4 Subtleties in the plurality opinion, however, indicate a change in the Court's sentence disproportionality doctrine. First, the plurality opinion found support for California's criminal policy by repeatedly noting that most other states had similar criminal statutes. 25 This analysis seems similar to the interjurisdictional comparison advocated in Solem, but denied in Harmelin. Perhaps the Court is conceding that interjurisdictional analysis is one of the few objective criteria available for assessing if a punishment is unusual. Second, the plurality opinion framed the facts generally, rather than individually. 226 Thus, the opinion paralleled the five 220 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 944, n.14 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that Supreme Court precedent directs courts to consider violent crimes more seriously than non-violent crimes).
... Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (plurality opinion). 222 Id. at 24-29 (plurality opinion). 223 Id. at 24 (plurality opinion). 224 See id. at 37-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the critical difference between Solem and Rummel was the availability of parole). 225 Id. at 24 (plurality opinion) ("[M]ost States have had laws providing for enhanced sentencing of repeat offenders."); Id. at 28 (plurality opinion) ("Theft of $1,200 in property is a felony under federal law and in the vast majority of States.") (internal citations omitted). 226 Id. at 28 (plurality opinion) (describing Ewing's crime as felony grand theft rather than Ewing's description of his crime as "shoplifting three golf clubs").
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Justice holding in Harmelin that individual facts, such as offender's age and culpability, should not be considered in a disproportionality claim. 227 Third, the plurality opinion stated that proportionality analysis should consider "not only [the offender's] current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. '228 This seems to weaken the holding in Solem, where the Court held that proportionality review must "focus on the principle felony," though prior convictions were also relevant. 229 Nonetheless, lower court opinions have not interpreted Ewing as a major change in sentence proportionality jurisprudence. 230 to the failure of a majority of Justices to reach a consensus on the basis for the result, Ewing does not significantly clarify the 'grossly disproportionate' standard other than to reaffirm it will be violated only in the 'rare' case."). For practical reasons, the lower courts should consider Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion as the controlling law, since the plurality's sentence proportionality determination controls whether the Court would find a sentence constitutional or not. That is, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would always find a sentence constitutional. The dissenters would never find a sentence constitutional that the plurality did not find constitutional. Thus, the three Justice plurality determination forms a majority with either Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas or the dissenters. 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Constitution of the United States. 24 2 The Court needs to assert a more active role in protecting an individual's Eighth Amendment guarantee from excessive prison sentence. In addition, the Court needs to clearly define the criteria it considers under prison sentence review.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S SENTENCE DISPROPORTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE
The Validity of Judicial Review of Disproportionate Prison Sentences
In Ewing, seven Justices held that the Eighth Amendment forbids excessive sentences in extreme cases. 243 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas argued that the Eighth Amendment does not forbid disproportionate sentences, but only forbids cruel and unusual modes of punishments. 2 " The plurality opinion gives great deference to legislative bodies to determine the bounds of constitutional sentences. 245 However, if the Eighth Amendment does forbid disproportionate sentences, then the Court-not legislative bodies-must determine what sentences are unconstitutional. 246 A textual analysis of the Eighth Amendment and a review of its history indicate that the Eighth Amendment forbids disproportionate sentences. In addition, Supreme Court precedent demands that criminal punishments be in proportion to the crime.
Obviously, the best way of understanding a law is by looking at its text-that is why we write them down. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted., 247 A punishment is cruel if it is "disposed to inflict pain" or "bitterly conducted: devoid of mildness" or "severe: distressing. ' , 248 A punishment is unusual by "being out of the ordinary" or "deviating from the normal.
' 249 A textual interpretation of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause would be that it forbids a punishment that deviates from the normal and causes pain. Thus, the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause should at least forbid the [Vol. 94 hypothetical case of a life sentence for overtime parking since it is out of the ordinary and would cause pain. 5°F urthermore, it would be odd for the Eighth Amendment to forbid the lesser punishment of an excessive fine, but allow the harsher penalty of an excessive prison sentence. 25 ' Justice Scalia suggests one reason the American Framers might have been concerned about excessive fines but not excessive prison terms, is that fines are a source of revenue for the state while imprisonment costs the state money. 2 Thus, a legislature would have an incentive to exact excessive fines and a disincentive to exact excessive prison sentences because that would be a burden to the legislature's constituency. 25 3 However, this economic analysis does not properly emphasize the Constitution's protection to an individual to be free from improper government interference. 4 Furthermore, legislative bodies often fail to estimate the costs of criminal imprisonment when creating sentencing laws, so this does not properly regulate the state from applying excessive sentences. 255 Justice Scalia also argues that the historical evidence surrounding the adoption of the Eighth Amendment only indicates concern over cruel and unusual modes of punishment. 2 56 It is not surprising that the few historical references surrounding the adoption of the Eighth Amendment indicate a concern only with certain types of punishments. 7 The use of "racks and gibbets" by the English government would still be fresh in the minds of the Americans forming a government with the potential to punish. 258 However, the broad wording of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause was likely an intentional choice by the framers to allow future generations to define cruel and unusual punishments. 259 
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worded the Eighth Amendment to forbid the use of "racks and gibbets," but that would limit the Amendment's protection in the future.
60
Moreover, Americans believed they retained all the rights of English citizens when they separated from England. 26 ' Indeed, the language of the Eighth Amendment was derived from the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.262 The prohibition of excessive fines in the English Declaration of Rights came from the Magna Carta's prohibition of excessive fines.
263
English common law courts extended the Magna Carta's proportionality requirement to prison sentences when they replaced criminal fines as the common mode of punishment in England during the 1400s.2 64 Presumably, the English Declaration of Rights maintained this prohibition against disproportionate prison sentences. Thus, Americans likely believed they retained this protection from disproportionate sentences when they adopted the Eighth Amendment.
Supreme Court precedent also demands proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment. For instance, the Supreme Court reviews capital punishment cases based on proportionality. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court held that, because of disproportionality, it was a violation of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause to impose capital punishment for rape of an adult woman. 65 In Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that it violated the Eighth Amendment, because of disproportionality, to impose the death penalty upon a participant in a felony that results in murder, without any inquiry into the participant's intent to kill. 266 The Supreme Court has also recently held that the execution of a mentally retarded criminal is a disproportionate punishment. 26 7 Justice Scalia tried to distinguish these cases as "an aspect of our death penalty jurisprudence, rather than a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law" because "death is different., 268 As Justice White points out in his dissent in Harmelin, however, this would reject the notion that the Clause only forbids modes or methods of punishment. 269 Presumably, the death penalty is a cruel and 273 The majority opinion of the Court did not consider the Eighth Amendment claim since the Eighth Amendment did not apply to states at the time. 274 However, all three dissenting Justices agreed that the Eighth Amendment forbids disproportionate sentences. 2 75 In Rummel, the Court stated that it is a matter of legislative prerogative to determine the prison sentences for crimes classified as felonies. 276 In a fateful footnote, however, the Court conceded that proportionality review could come into play in the extreme case where a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.
277
In Solem, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment includes the right to be free from excessive punishments. 27 8 Since Solem, a majority of the Court has since upheld the notion that the Eighth Amendment at least forbids grossly disproportionate sentences. 2 9 Thus, Supreme Court precedent recognizes a proportionality requirement under the Eighth Amendment between a criminal's punishment and his offense. 
The Proportionality Principles Give too Much Deference to
2004]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW bodies. 28° Certainly, this is true when the criminal punishment is constitutional, but legislative bodies cannot make criminal punishment decisions that contradict the Constitution.281 The Court gives too much deference to legislative bodies to determine whether a sentence falls within the bounds of the Constitution. In Ewing, the Court stated that a habitual sentencing scheme is legitimate if the legislature has a "reasonable basis" for believing the sentence "advance[s] the goals of its criminal justice system in any substantial way., 282 Surely, though, a state could not compel a defendant to be a witness against herself simply because it advances the state's criminal justice goals. The suggestion that a legislatively mandated punishment is per se constitutional conflicts with the principle of judicial review. The Court supports its deference to legislative bodies by observing that they have the support of the majority of the people.
2 85 However, the whole point of the Constitution is to protect certain rights against majority infringement. 286 If popular will determined what is constitutional, then the Constitution would have no value. Instead, the Constitution prohibits the government from using popular will as a justification for intruding on an individual's rights. 287 The rights of citizens convicted of a crime are particularly vulnerable to infringement by popular will, as many believe that one who breaks the law does not deserve the protection of the law. Moreover, infringements on the rights of criminals are easily ignored, since they are are isolated from the public. Yet criminals are still legal citizens of the United States protected under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The Supreme Court does not adequately acknowledge an individual's federal Constitutional right to be free from 280 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). It is unclear if Justice Kennedy is just stating the obvious that legislative bodies should be given deference when they employ constitutional criminal punishments or if he is making the more alarming statement that the bounds of the Eighth Amendment change depending on legislative determinations. justification for punishment is that it is retribution for an injustice. According to Aristotle, the law should treat the criminal and victim as equals. 292 If the court determines a person has inflicted an injustice on another, the judge should redress the inequality by punishing the offender an equivalent amount, thereby making the parties equal again. 293 Thus, Aristotle seeks strict proportionality between the punishment and the offense. 294 In its purest form, strict proportionality would require the same offense perpetrated by the criminal to be committed back on the criminal. 295 This is exemplified in the Old Testament's punishment principle of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. 296 However, society's acceptance of prison sentences as the standard for criminal punishment makes determining strict proportionality between punishment and crime difficult, as a prison sentence is usually different from the criminal's act.
Thus, strict proportionality is difficult to maintain under modern penological theory.
Furthermore, strict proportionality is inappropriate given the Supreme Court's acceptance of utilitarian penological theories. 297 Unlike a retributive justification for punishment that aims to punish individuals in relation to the scope of their offenses, a utilitarian justification seeks to impose punishment that will produce beneficial results for society in the 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW future. 298 Three main penological theories have developed under the utilitarian view: deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 299 Deterrence is based on the theory that if a criminal knows he will be punished harshly for a crime, then he will be discouraged from committing that crime. 300 A person could have an incentive to commit a crime if an offender's sentence was strictly proportioned to his crime. 30 ' For instance, suppose that half of robbery crimes are solved and that robbery is punished in exact proportion to the amount of money stolen. A criminal planning to steal a hundred dollars would expect only a fifty dollar penalty (hundred dollar punishment multiplied by fifty percent chance of being caught), thus providing an incentive to the criminal to commit crime. Thus, by setting punishments that are disproportionately higher than the offense, a deterrent punishment seeks to discourage crime.
3 02 However, detractors of deterrent punishments argue that it is unfair to punish a person in excess of his crime just to set an example to the rest of society. 30 3 As Immanuel Kant noted, "One man ought never to be dealt with as a means subservient to the purpose of another ...
. "304
Rehabilitation is based on the penological theory that punishment can help reform the criminal so that his wish to commit crimes will be lessened, and perhaps so that he can be a useful member of society in the future. 30 5 The unpleasantness of serving a punishment might be enough to make a criminal avoid future crime and punishment. 30 6 However, rehabilitation usually involves positive steps to alter criminal behavior and develop skills, in order to make the criminal less antisocial. 30 7 Critics of rehabilitative punishment question its success in correcting criminal behavior and object to rewarding a criminal with positive steps such as education. [Vol. 94
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Incapacitation is based on the theory that isolation of a criminal from society will end the risk that he will harm society again.
3°9 Incapacitation physically prevents a dangerous person from acting upon their destructive tendencies.
31 0
The death penalty, for instance, is a way for society to guarantee that incredibly violent criminals will never cause future harm to society. 311 Critics argue that incapacitation can be both overly expensive for society and unnecessarily cruel to criminals that potentially would never commit another crime.
312
The Eighth Amendment should nonetheless provide a ceiling against excessive utilitarian-based prison sentences. Acceptance of utilitarian theories of punishment makes strict proportionality impractical. Indeed, some of the utilitarian justifications for punishment overtly contradict strict proportionality between punishment and offense. 313 For example, deterrence explicitly makes the punishment disproportionately greater than the crime so that criminals have a disincentive to commit the crime. However, this should not mean that courts have no role in reviewing deterrent-based punishments.
5
Courts need to consider whether the punishment does indeed provide a benefit to society or whether it is just a "purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. 3 16 For example, imposing a life sentence without parole to a child that steals a candy bar would certainly deter other candy thefts and incapacitate the child from stealing anymore candy bars, but it is unreasonably excessive in achieving those objectives. 317 Thus, the Supreme Court should require that a penological theory does not lead to excessive punishment. In addition, the Supreme Court has only reviewed a few cases for sentence disproportionality. Thus, lower courts are left to fill many gaps between cases. Yet how is a lower court supposed to assess factual situations within these gaps without clear objective factors? Many lower courts have turned to Justice Breyer's dissent in Ewing for help in such situations, since he specified three factors that he thought were relevant in disproportionality claims: (1) "the length of the prison term in real time"; (2) the sentence-triggering offense; and (3) the offender's criminal history. 334 (finding a mandatory fifty-two year prison sentence for a twenty-year-old defendant for having non-coerced sex with two postpubescent teenage girls disproportionate because of the offender's youth, after noting comments from jury and victims' mothers that sentence was unjust).
334 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW triggering offense from his criminal past. In Ewing, the plurality opinion considered Ewing's criminal history collectively with his sentencetriggering offense when assessing the .severity of his crime. 335 But combining the sentence-triggering offense with the offender's criminal history may unreasonably inflate the severity of the crime. 336 For instance, if a criminal with a violent criminal history is arrested for illegally bringing in foreign agriculture to the United States, a court that sentenced the criminal as if he again committed a violent offense would be inflating the offender's crime. Instead, the court should sentence him for breaking United States' customs law and augment the sentence based on his past criminal record.
However, the majority of the Supreme Court correctly refused to accept parole as a factor in disproportionality claims in Rummel. 337 Parole is not an enforceable individual right, but is instead dependent on state discretion. 338 For instance, as of 2000, the parole authority in California only recommended parole in one percent of the 2000 cases that came before them with a life sentence. 339 By allowing courts to consider parole in assessing the severity of a sentence, the Court would be allowing states an easy way to tailor constitutional sentencing schemes while maintaining control over a criminal's sentence.
B. THE PROPER ROLE FOR COURTS IN REVIEIWING EXCESSIVE PRISON SENTENCES
The Supreme Court's current sentence disproportionality jurisprudence is so muddled that it is useless. 340 The Court appears to say that the Eighth Amendment forbids disproportionate sentences, but that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit sentences mandated by state legislative bodies, except if the sentence is not the result of a criminal policy decision. The Court needs to refocus its sentence disproportionality jurisprudence on the Eighth Amendment's forbiddance of cruel and unusual punishment. A textual analysis of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause provides a 31 Id. at 28-30 (plurality opinion). [Vol. 94
good guide for what sentences are prohibited. In particular, a sentence must be both (1) cruel and (2) unusual for the Constitution to apply.
A court should find a sentence "cruel" if it is excessive. 34 ' Unfortunately, there is no clear line for determining when a sentence is excessive. This determination is much like the Court's current threshold test of whether a comparison between an offender's sentence and his crime creates an inference of disproportionality. However, the Court currently makes this analysis from the point of view of the state, not of the individual. Thus, incapacitation of a repeat thief is constitutional because states have an interest in curbing the harm caused by repeat thefts. However, the Eighth Amendment was adopted to protect individuals from government intrusion. Therefore, the question should be whether the sentence is excessive considering the specific facts of the individual. States may still use utilitarian-based punishment schemes under this test, but they cannot be so broad that they cause purposeless pain on individuals. 342 By adopting this approach, courts would link sentencing review with other areas where the court reviews sentence proportionality, such as capital punishment, excessive criminal fines, and excessive civil fines.
Second, a court should find a sentence unusual if it is "out of the ordinary" or "deviating from the normal.
A comparison between a state's sentencing standards and the federal government's sentencing standards provides a useful test for determining if the sentence is unusual given federal standards. 34 4 However, a court should also compare the sentence with sentences in other states. This determination is primarily an objective determination. Fears that this infringes on federalism rights are diminished by the fact that a sentence must be both cruel and unusual. Thus, if a state experiments with a scheme that is unusual, but not cruel, the Eighth Amendment would not apply.
341 "Excessive" is a more workable understanding of cruel than the dictionary definitions of "disposed to inflict pain" or "bitterly conducted: devoid of mildness" or "severe:
distressing." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 546 (1976). Indeed, nearly all sentences are "disposed to inflict pain," so cruel would be easily met under the dictionary definition.
342 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (stating that a punishment offends the Eighth Amendment "if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain").
343 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2514 (1976).
